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Bisexuals need not apply: a comparative appraisal of refugee law and
policy in Canada, the United States, and Australia
Sean Rehaag
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada
This paper offers an analysis of refugee claims on grounds of bisexuality. After
discussing the grounds on which sexual minorities may qualify for refugee status
under international refugee law, the paper empirically assesses the success rates of
bisexual refugee claimants in three major host states: Canada, the United States, and
Australia. It concludes that bisexuals are signiﬁcantly less successful than other
sexual minority groups in obtaining refugee status in those countries. Through an
examination of selected published decisions involving bisexual refugee claimants,
the author identiﬁes two main areas for concern that may partly account for the
difﬁculties that bisexual refugee claimants encounter: the invisibility of bisexuality as
a sexual identity, and negative views held by some refugee claims adjudicators
towards bisexuality as well as the reluctance of some adjudicators to grant refugee
status to sexual minorities who differ from gay and lesbian identities as traditionally
understood.
Keywords: bisexuality; sexual orientation; refugee; asylum; law; credibility; Canada;
Australia; United States
The world is not to be divided into sheep and goats . . . It is a fundamental of taxonomy that
nature rarely deals with discrete categories. Only the human mind invents categories and
tries to force facts into separated pigeon-holes. The sooner we learn this concerning human
sexual behavior the sooner we shall reach a sound understanding of the realities of sex.1

Introduction
Bisexuality tends to be invisible in human rights practice and discourse, even in areas that
are otherwise comparatively sensitive to sexual minority issues.2 For example, at the time of
writing, the European Human Rights Reports lists 68 cases that mentioned lesbians or
homosexuals, but only four that mentioned bisexuals.3 Similarly, the Canadian Human
Rights Tribunal referred to lesbians or homosexuals in 24 decisions, but to bisexuals in
only two decisions.4 An equally revealing picture of the invisibility of bisexuality is
evident in the names of prominent non-governmental organisations ﬁghting for the
human rights of sexual minorities. Consider, for example, the International Gay and
Lesbian Human Rights Commission,5 the International Gay and Lesbian Association,6

the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force,7 the Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby,8 the
Lesbian and Gay Equality Project,9 and Equality for Gays and Lesbians.10
In light of such invisibility, this paper aims to bring greater attention to bisexuality in
one particular area of international human rights: international sexual minority refugee law.
An individual who is outside his or her country of origin, and who has a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of his or her sexual orientation, meets the international legal
deﬁnition of a refugee and is eligible for refugee status.11 However, as I will demonstrate
in this paper, bisexuals who allege a feared persecution on account of their sexual identity
are frequently unable to secure refugee status. I argue that among the primary causes of the
difﬁculties bisexual refugee claimants encounter are negative views held by some refugee
claims adjudicators towards bisexuality, as well as the reluctance of some adjudicators to
grant refugee status to sexual minorities who differ from gay and lesbian identities as
traditionally understood.
My argument will proceed by ﬁrst providing a brief introduction to international sexual
minority refugee law. Then, I will examine the experiences of bisexual refugees in
three major host states: Canada, the United States, and Australia. Through both quantitative
and qualitative analysis of these experiences, I will demonstrate that bisexual refugee
claimants have more difﬁculty securing refugee status than do other groups of sexual
minorities. Finally, I will examine some of the reasons why bisexuals encounter difﬁculties
securing refugee status.
Before turning to my main argument, it is pertinent to ﬁrst address the terminology used
in this paper. Debates regarding appropriate labels for sexual behaviours, sexual identities,
and sexual orientations are one of the mainstays of discussions about what human rights
have to say about sexual minorities.12 One source of these debates is that, regardless of
which terminology one chooses to embrace, it will inevitably fail to accord with the selfunderstanding of many of those who are supposed to be covered by the terminology.

There have, for example, been sharp disagreements over terms such as MSM (men who
have sex with men), WSW (women who have sex with women), ‘homosexual’, ‘gay’,
LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender), and ‘queer’.13 Some of the concerns
expressed over such terms include whether a term occludes distinct sexual identities and
complex intersectional considerations related to gender, class, race, language, religion,
physical ability, HIV status, and so on;14 whether one inappropriately conﬂates (or
bifurcates) sexual behaviours and sexual identities;15 and whether one excludes
particular groups that ought to be included.16 Moreover, cross-cultural dimensions add a
further level of complexity to these debates, because even if one’s chosen terminology is
accepted within one community, it may be inappropriate in communities located in other
regions of the world.17
In this paper, I adopt the general term ‘sexual minorities’. I choose the term because it
has relatively unsettled and imprecise boundaries. This imprecision is helpful, as it allows
the term to include all persons seeking protection from persecution on account of
heteronormativity,18 irrespective of their precise sexual identities or sexual behaviours.19
One further terminological matter remains: my use of the term ‘bisexuality’. Debates
about appropriate labels are, if anything, even more pronounced with respect to bisexuality
than to other sexual minority identities.20 Once again, cross-cultural considerations muddy
the waters. Some of those characterised in one locale as ‘bisexual’ may be viewed in others
as ‘homosexual’ or ‘heterosexual’.21 In the context of this paper, it is necessary to note in
particular that a person who would otherwise identify as exclusively homosexual may be
coerced into different-sex sexual relations or into adopting bisexual identities through
hetero-normative persecution.22
This paper attempts to sidestep some of these debates over the deﬁnition of ‘bisexuality’
because my interest is not to set out a particular deﬁnition and advocate its use by refugee
claims adjudicators. Rather, my interest is to explore how sexual minority refugee

claimants whose cases involve allegations of non-gender-exclusive sexuality are treated
in the refugee determination systems in several major host states. In this paper, therefore,
I use the term ‘bisexual’ loosely to mean a person whose sexual orientation, sexual identity,
or sexual behaviour is not directed exclusively towards persons of one particular sex or
gender.23

International refugee law and sexual minorities
It is well settled in international refugee law that non-citizens facing persecution abroad on
account of their sexual orientations are eligible for refugee status.24 The 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees,25 however, does not explicitly include sexual
orientation. The Convention deﬁnes a refugee as any person who

owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country.26

Some sexual minority refugees have – with varying degrees of success – attempted to argue
that their fear of persecution stemmed from their ‘political opinion’.27 The argument has, thus
far, proved to be particularly effective for human rights activists who encounter
heteronormative persecution as a result of their efforts to enhance the rights of sexual
minorities.28 Political opinion, however, has been interpreted very broadly in international
refugee law to cover ‘any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of State,
government, and policy may be engaged’.29 As a result, one could plausibly argue that
‘political opinion’ covers sexual minorities who face persecution for challenging both
traditional gender norms as well as the inevitability of heterosexuality. With respect

to the former (i.e. traditional gender norms), the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution state that political
opinion ‘may include an opinion as to gender roles. It would also include non-conformist
behaviour which leads the persecutor to impute a political opinion.’30 This is signiﬁcant
because persecution targeting sexual minorities often aims to ‘foster and maintain
“appropriate” gender role behaviour’.31 Meanwhile,

with regard to the latter (i.e.

challenging the inevitability of heterosexuality), the argument would ﬁnd some support in
the commonly made claim that the heterosexually structured family is the fundamental
socio-economic unit, one that is supported through a variety of state policies.32 Sexual
minorities, by their very existence, may be understood as challenging both the heterosexual
family and the state policies that support it. In other words, sexual minorities may have
political opinions regarding gender roles and the heterosexual family imputed to them,
and may be persecuted on that basis.33
One might also plausibly contend that hetero-normative persecution sometimes
involves not only persecution on grounds of ‘political opinion’ but also persecution on
grounds of ‘religion’.34 The UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, for
example, state that

[i]n certain States, the religion assigns particular roles or behavioural codes to women and men
respectively. Where a woman does not fulﬁl her assigned role or refuses to abide by the codes,
and is punished as a consequence, she may have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of religion. Failure to abide by such codes may be perceived as evidence that a
woman holds unacceptable religious opinions regardless of what she actually believes.35

Just as women who are persecuted for transgressing gender roles or behavioural codes
prescribed by religious dogmas may – irrespective of their actual religious beliefs36 –
be understood as facing persecution on grounds of religion, so too can sexual minorities.37

Indeed, as Nicole LaViolette notes, many sexual minority refugee claims involve fears of
persecution where the claimant’s ‘[h]omosexuality is not only perceived as non-conformity
to gender-speciﬁc roles but also . . . a crime against religion’.38 The argument would seem
especially warranted where the agents of persecution are in one way or another tied to
religious institutions – which is not unlikely given the longstanding hetero-normative
traditions in most major world religions. It would also be worth pursuing such an
argument in countries where religious and state institutions are not sharply divided.39
Although persecution on grounds of either religion or political opinion presents avenues
for securing refugee status that are, in principle, open at least to some sexual minorities
facing hetero-normative persecution, it is much more common for sexual minority
refugee claimants to argue that they meet the refugee deﬁnition because they face
persecution on grounds of their ‘membership in a particular social group’.40
One of the leading cases on what exactly constitutes a ‘particular social group’ is the
Canadian Supreme Court decision, Ward v. Canada.41 In Ward, Justice La Forest explained
that there were three distinct types of ‘particular social groups’ for the purpose of the
refugee deﬁnition:

(1) groups deﬁned by an innate or unchangeable characteristic;
(2) groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to their
human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association; and
(3) groups associated by a former voluntary status, unalterable due to its historical
permanence.42

Offering examples of each of the three types of social groups, Justice La Forest stated
that ‘[t]he ﬁrst category would embrace .. . sexual orientation’.43 In other words, sexual
minorities facing persecution qualify for refugee protection as ‘particular social groups’

because, according to Justice La Forest, sexual orientation is an ‘innate or unchangeable
personal characteristic’.44
This passage has been cited with approval by courts in jurisdictions around the world45
and by the UNHCR Guidelines on Social Group Claims.46 However, there has been some
recent movement away from this approach to sexual minority refugee jurisprudence.
Following Ward, a number of commentators have sharply critiqued Justice La Forest’s
reliance on the purported ‘innate or immutable’ nature of sexual orientation.47 According to
these commentators, there are both strategic and symbolic beneﬁts in grounding sexual
minority refugee protection within the second category of ‘particular social groups’
identiﬁed in Ward: groups that associate ‘for reasons so fundamental to their human
dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association.’48 It is worth noting that
this second category in Ward – which I will call the fundamental human dignity
approach – has been given a slightly modiﬁed interpretation in subsequent
international refugee law, most signiﬁcantly through the UNHCR Guidelines on Social
Group Claims.49 According to these Guidelines, the focus of the fundamental human
dignity approach is not on whether members of a particular social group actually
‘voluntarily associate’, but rather on the question of whether the characteristic that the
group shares is ‘fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human
rights’.50
The strategic advantage of embracing the fundamental human dignity approach is that
the approach insulates sexual minority refugee protection from any possible shifts in
research in science or social sciences on the ‘causes’ of sexual orientation. Views on the
‘causes’ of sexual orientation have long been hotly contested by scientists and social scientists
alike. Many researchers suggest that sexual orientation is either related to genetics or to early
childhood experiences (or to some combination of the two). Thus, they understand sexual
orientation as by and large a ﬁxed psychosocial characteristic.51

Other researchers,

however, suggest that sexual orientation can and does change over time. Admittedly, some
of such research is associated with those who controversially assert that homosexuality is a
psychological condition that can be ‘cured’52 through so-called ‘conversion therapy’ or
‘sexual reorientation therapy’.53 As a study on political agendas in conversion therapy notes,

Current approaches tend to utilize religious and psychodynamic principles that deﬁne
homosexuality as a ‘condition’ that results when a child does not receive sufﬁcient love
through the attachment to the same-sex parent .. . For the sake of salvation, sexual reorientation
programs tend to rely on the power of God and prayer to help the repentant homosexual
strengthen willpower, reduce desire, and limit behavior .. . Heterosexual marriage and children
are promised, which sexual reorientation therapists consider a healthy adaptation to a
heterosexual world.54

However, some of the research ﬁnding that sexual orientation is mutable has emerged from
scholars who do not hold disparaging views about homosexuality. Rather, these scholars
emphasise the socially contingent and shifting aspects of human sexuality – including
heterosexuality – and argue that human sexuality is too complex to be fully captured by
models that hold that people simply ‘are’ homosexual or heterosexual (or any other
sexual identity).55 Indeed, one of the primary aims of these scholars – often called ‘queer
theorists’ – is to elucidate the power politics at play in what they view as the processes
of social regulation that produce individuals who ‘perform’ naturalised sexual identities.56
What I want to emphasise here is that the debate over the ‘immutability’ of sexual
orientation remains controversial and neither side of the debate has an exclusive claim to
represent the views held by sexual minorities. In this context, it seems unwise to use the
presumed ‘immutability’ of sexual orientation as the reason why sexual minorities facing
hetero-normative persecution are entitled to refugee status. The risk is that, if the view
of sexual orientation advocated by those on the ‘mutability’ side of the debate becomes

dominant, then sexual minorities facing persecution will no longer meet the refugee
deﬁnition. Nancy Knauer cautions against the risky strategy of tying sexual minority
rights to a particular strain of evidence in science or social sciences regarding the nature
and causes of sexual orientation:

By premising their rights claims .. . on assertions of immutable status, pro-gay advocates have
entrusted the success of a major social and political movement to the reliability of a few
inconclusive studies concerning, inter alia, the size of the hypothalamus in the cadavers of
gay men and the inner ears of lesbians.57

One strategic advantage, then, of grounding sexual minority refugee claims on the
foundational principle that no one should be required to change their sexual orientations,
rather than on the idea that no one can change their sexual orientations, is that sexual
minorities will be able to secure refugee status irrespective of the ebbs and ﬂows of the
debates on the ‘causes’ of sexual orientation.
Just as important as this strategic advantage of the fundamental human dignity approach
is that the immutability approach to sexual minority refugee protection carries problematic
symbolic implications. To see these implications, let us consider why Justice La Forest
attached relevance to whether sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic. It is
important to note, in this regard, that Justice La Forest inferred the three types of
‘particular social groups’ mentioned above from the human rights commitments
animating international refugee law.58 One of these human rights commitments inheres
in the basic objection to differential treatment based on characteristics for which human
beings cannot normatively be held responsible. If they are not responsible for their
sexual orientations – if sexual orientations are, in other words, immutable personal
characteristics – then differential treatment based on sexual orientation runs foul of this
objection. Yoshino characterises these sorts of arguments as involving what he calls the

‘immutability defense’.59 As Yoshino puts it, ‘[g]ays often defend their homosexuality
by characterizing it as an immutable trait . . . Immutability has exonerative force because
of the widely held belief that it is abhorrent to penalize individuals for matters beyond
their control.’60
Compare the message the immutability defence approach sends with that which inheres
in the alternative foundation for sexual minority protection, the fundamental human dignity
approach, which holds that no human beings should be required to change their sexual
orientations. The latter approach sends the message that sexual orientation is so closely
connected to a person’s fundamental human dignity that persecution aimed at enforcing
‘compulsory heterosexuality’61 and traditional gender norms62 is a human rights violation
of such magnitude as to trigger refugee protection. Rather than presenting sexual minorities
as unpopular minorities in need of protection because individuals are not responsible
for their sexual orientations, this approach presents hetero-normative persecution as an
impermissible trespass upon a person’s fundamental human dignity.63
In recent years, courts and refugee claims tribunals in several jurisdictions have begun
to embrace this alternative approach to sexual minority jurisprudence, perhaps due to its
strategic and symbolic advantages. For example, in Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S.,64 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that sexual minorities fell
within both the ﬁrst and second categories of ‘particular social groups’ identiﬁed in
Ward.65 That is to say, one reason why sexual minorities persecuted abroad are entitled
to refugee status and asylum in the United States is that ‘sexual orientation and sexual
identity . . . are so fundamental to one’s identity that a person should not be required to
abandon

them’.66 Tribunals in Australia67 and New Zealand68 have come to similar

conclusions and have refused to consider sexual minority refugee protection solely
through the lens of protection for groups deﬁned by innate and unchangeable
characteristics.69

In principle, then, the ultimate rationale for sexual minority refugee protection appears
to be shifting away from the contention that sexual orientation is an immutable
characteristic, and towards the view that persecutory enforcement of compulsory
heterosexuality and traditional gender norms is an infringement of fundamental human
dignity. However, closer attention to case law reveals that sexual minority refugee claims
continue in practice to be measured against relatively rigid and immutable
understandings of sexual orientations. Nowhere is this clearer than in the experience of
bisexual refugee claimants.70

The experience of bisexual refugee claimants in selected host states
Bisexual refugee claimants’ experience, while varying to some degree across host states,
shares two major features: (1) their presence in the host states’ refugee jurisprudence is
largely invisible and (2) they face extremely low refugee claim success rates. Both these
features are evident in the experience of bisexual refugee claimants in three major host
states: Canada, the United States, and Australia.

Canada
In Canada, the earliest published case explicitly involving a bisexual refugee claimant was
decided in 2000.71 The decision involved a refugee claimant from Mexico who selfidentiﬁed as a ‘bisexual man who prefers men and being a transvestite’72 and who had
been repeatedly brutalised by the Mexican police.73 The claimant obtained refugee
status, largely on the basis of persuasive country condition evidence involving frequent
reports of violence directed towards transvestites in Mexico.74
However, in the following years, other bisexual refugee claimants have been largely
unsuccessful in obtaining refugee protection. For example, according to a recent study
undertaken by the author, no explicitly bisexual refugee claimant was granted refugee

status in reported Canadian refugee decisions between 2001 and 2004.75 In evaluating
this ﬁgure, it should be noted that the study identiﬁed only 11 reported refugee decisions
involving bisexuals, out of a total of 115 reported sexual minority refugee decisions.76
Moreover, it should be borne in mind that only a small fraction of Canadian refugee
decisions are published, and those that are published cannot be taken to be a representative
sample of all refugee determinations.77
To get a clearer picture of how sexual minority refugee claims – including bisexual
refugee claims – are actually being decided in Canada, it is possible to use a formal
request through the Access to Information Act78 to obtain data directly from the database
of the administrative tribunal responsible for refugee determinations in Canada, that is,
the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB).79
According to data acquired through a formal Access to Information request regarding
refugee determinations by the IRB in 2006,80 bisexual refugee claims made up approximately
8% of sexual minority refugee claims decided by the IRB in 2006 (44 out of 577 decisions).
The success rate for sexual minority claimants (58%) exceeded the average success rates at
the IRB for the year (54%). However, the success rate for bisexual refugee claimants
(39%) was signiﬁcantly lower. It is, moreover, worth noting that while the success rates
for gay male and lesbian claimants were virtually identical (60%), cases involving gay
men (424) signiﬁcantly outnumbered cases involving lesbians (100). In cases involving
bisexuals, male claimants (33) once again outnumbered female claimants (11), but whereas
success rates for gay and lesbian claimants matched closely, success rates for male bisexual
claimants (33%) were lower than those for female bisexual claimants (55%).81
The author’s previous study, which examined all (that is, reported and unreported)
sexual minority refugee decisions by the IRB in 2004, came to mostly similar conclusions.
According to that study, bisexual refugee claims made up 7% of sexual minority claims
(100 out of 1351 decisions). Moreover, the success rate in sexual minority refugee

claims (49%) slightly exceeded the average IRB success rates for the year (46%), and far
exceeded the success rate in bisexual refugee claims (25%).82
It appears then that, notwithstanding the success of the claimant in the ﬁrst reported
refugee decision involving a bisexual in Canada, bisexual refugee claimants have had a
difﬁcult time obtaining refugee status in Canada, compared with both refugee claimants
in general and sexual minority refugee claimants in particular.83

United States
Although Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, a leading US case, explicitly considered the
possibility that framing sexual minority refugee law exclusively in terms of
homosexuality and heterosexuality may be ‘too restrictive’,84 reported cases involving
bisexual applicants for refugee status and asylum in the United States have been rare.85
Indeed, there has only been one federal court decision explicitly involving a bisexual
applicant, and in that case the applicant’s bisexuality was mentioned only in passing.86
Moreover, the ﬁrst – and thus far only – United States Board of Immigration Appeals
case involving an explicitly bisexual applicant for refugee status and asylum currently
reported in legal databases was decided in
2007.87 In that case an HIV-positive bisexual from Mexico was unsuccessful in obtaining
refugee status and asylum in the United States.88
There are currently no statistics available on unreported average grant rates in refugee
applications in the United States involving sexual minorities.89 However, it is possible to
get a sense of what such statistics might reveal by using information obtained from the
Asylum Documentation Program (ADP) of the International Gay and Lesbian Human
Rights Commission.90 From 1994 to 2007, the ADP assisted sexual minority refugee
claimants, and their advocates, by providing documentation on the conditions faced by
sexual minorities in particular countries abroad. When the ADP was contacted for

assistance, staff recorded details of their cases in a database. Where possible, the
outcomes of the cases in which the ADP provided assistance were also recorded.
According to the ADP’s internal database,91 bisexual cases were rarely reported to the
ADP. In fact, bisexual cases represented less than 1% of the cases involving sexual minority
refugee claimants in the United States that were reported to the ADP from 1994 to 2007 (38
cases out of 4241). Cases involving bisexual men (35) were more frequently reported than
those involving bisexual women (3), just as reported cases involving gay men (3576) were
much more common than those involving lesbians (627).
As with the Canadian data, the grant rate for bisexuals (5%) was signiﬁcantly lower than
the rate for gay men and lesbians (17%) in cases where the ﬁnal outcomes were reported
to the ADP. However, caution must be exercised when interpreting these statistics. In
particular, the reported grant rates likely signiﬁcantly understated the actual grant
rates in sexual minority refugee claims, in large part because, due to limited
resources, the ADP was not able to systematically determine the outcomes of all cases
in which they offered assistance.92 As a result, data regarding refugee claim outcomes are
only available in 14% of the cases involving bisexuals, and 21% of the cases
involving gay men and lesbians reported to the ADP. Nonetheless, it seems signiﬁcant
that in the data collected by the ADP, whereas the grant rates of gay men (17%) and
lesbians (17%) matched closely, the grant rates of gay men and lesbians (17%), on one
hand, and bisexuals (5%), on the other, diverge signiﬁcantly.

Australia
As far back as 1997, Justice Kirby of the High Court of Australia ruled, obiter, that
‘homosexual and bisexual men and women’ qualify for asylum under the category of
those who suffer persecution on account of their membership in a particular social
group.93 This passage was then cited with approval by the Australian High Court in its
2003 decision holding that sexual minorities constituted a particular social group for

the purposes of refugee law.94 A subsequent Federal Court decision also explicitly
afﬁrmed that ‘bisexuals can form a particular social group for the purposes of refugee
law’.95
Although it is clear, then, that bisexuals facing persecution are in principle eligible for
refugee status in Australia, in practice reported refugee claims involving bisexuals appear to
have been quite rare. A study of Australian sexual minority refugee determinations from
1994 to 2000,96 undertaken by Jenni Millbank and Catherine Dauvergne, identiﬁed 204
sexual minority refugee determinations, out of which 161 involved men and 43 involved
women.97 In only two of the identiﬁed cases98 ‘the claimants self-identiﬁed as “bisexual” in
their applications’.99 Moreover, in these two cases the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal
(RRT), ‘rather than considering bisexuals as a particular social group, assumed the
applicants to be homosexual’.100 The authors of the study also identiﬁed two further
cases101 where the applicants were identiﬁed by the RRT as either bisexual102 or
ambiguous in their sexuality.103 In none of these four cases – all of which involved
men – did the applicant succeed in securing refugee status. It is worth noting that
during the same period the average grant rate in the Australian sexual minority refugee
decisions identiﬁed by Millbank and Dauvergne was 22%,104 with gay men (26%)
enjoying a signiﬁcantly higher grant rate than lesbians (7%).105
More recently, there have been some Australian cases where bisexual claimants have
secured refugee status,106 or where federal courts have overturned negative RRT decisions
involving bisexual claimants.107 Still – as with the experience of bisexuals in Canada and
the United States – these positive decisions remain the exception, rather than the rule.108

Analysis of the experience of bisexual refugee claimants
My review of the experience of bisexual asylum claimants in Canada, the United States, and
Australia has highlighted that bisexuals are largely invisible in refugee determination

systems, and that bisexuals seem to have a more difﬁcult time securing refugee status
than other groups of sexual minorities. It is, thus, pertinent to attempt to account for
these two central observations.

Bisexual invisibility
There is very little information currently available on bisexual refugee claimants in
Canada, the United States, or Australia. To begin with, as we have seen, there are few
reported bisexual refugee decisions, that is, decisions published in ofﬁcial law reports.
As we have also seen, however, according to data obtained from Canada’s IRB,
approximately 7 – 8% of sexual minority refugee claims made in Canada were identiﬁed
by the IRB as involving bisexuals. There is no reason to think that the proportion of
bisexuals among sexual minority refugee claimants in the United States or Australia is
any lower. The issue of why there have been few reported bisexual asylum decisions is,
therefore, a puzzle to be explored.
While some refugee law scholars have discussed bisexuality within larger analyses of
sexual minority refugee claims, there is relatively little scholarship that concentrates
exclusively on bisexual refugee claims.109 One reason why bisexuals have drawn little
attention in the area of international refugee law may be due to perceptions that refugee
claims involving bisexuals are uncommon because decisions involving such claims
have only infrequently been reported. This explanation, however, fails to fully account
for the lack of attention to bisexual refugee claims as they arise. After all, the number of
lesbian refugee claims is also low compared with the number of claims involving gay
men, and yet signiﬁcant scholarly attention has – quite rightly – been paid to analysing
and attempting to improve refugee determinations involving lesbians.110 Moreover, one
of the main preoccupations in the scholarly literature on lesbian refugee claimants is
precisely to examine why women are under-represented in sexual minority refugee
claims.111

In my view, a more persuasive explanation for the lack of attention to bisexual refugee
claimants in both reported decisions and in refugee law scholarship relates to a broader
social phenomenon identiﬁed by scholars who have engaged closely with bisexuality.
That social phenomenon is that bisexuals tend to be invisible in – or actively erased
from – both sexual minority and mainstream communities.112
Many theorists tie the invisibility of bisexuality to a naturalised conception of human
sexuality, in which human beings are understood to be either essentially heterosexual or
essentially homosexual.113 According to Kenji Yoshino, maintaining this naturalised
binary understanding of human sexuality serves the interests of heterosexual communities,
as heterosexuals inhabit a privileged position in this naturalised binary hierarchy.114
Gagnon, Greenblat, and Kimmel echo this view, noting that

Only a few thinkers [have begun] to consider what would happen if what appeared to be the
most natural of all forms of conduct, the conventionalised sexual relations of women and men,
was treated as problematic and the topic of history, anthropology, and sociology rather than
biology, psychiatry, and individualist psychologies. To entertain the belief that the sexual
desires of the majority are as much the result of a social construction as are the desires of
all sexual minorities is a classic example of what is bad (perhaps even intolerable) to think,
much less to practice.115

It is important to appreciate, however, that this naturalised binary is also useful to many in
sexual minority communities.116 In particular, essentialised homosexual subject positions
can form an important site for political mobilisation against heterosexist oppression.117
Moreover, in many states around the world, sexual minorities have resorted to essentialist
accounts of sexual orientations in order to bring constitutional challenges to heterosexist
discrimination.118 It is worth considering, in this regard, a remark by Justice Kirby, the
ﬁrst openly gay Justice of the Australian High Court:

The advent of the Human Genome Project and the likelihood that, in many cases at least, sexual
orientation is genetically determined, make it unacceptable to impose upon those affected
unreasonable legal discrimination or demands that they change. It was always unacceptable;
but now no informed person has an excuse for blind prejudice and unreasonable conduct. If
we are talking about the unnatural, demands that people deny their sexuality or try to
change it, if it is part of their nature, are a good illustration of what is unnatural. An increasing
number of citizens in virtually every Western democracy are coming inexorably to this
realisation.119

Now, Justice Kirby did not intend to suggest that human beings are genetically
predetermined to be either homosexual or heterosexual, to the exclusion of all
other sexual identities. On the contrary, in both court decisions and extra-judicial
writings, Justice Kirby regularly refers not only to gay men and lesbians, but also to
bisexuals and other groups

of

sexual

minorities.120 Nonetheless,

bisexuality

complicates the essentialist – and even biological determinist – account of human
sexuality at the heart of the above passage. It is this account of human sexuality that,
according to Yoshino, both heterosexual and many sexual minority communities have an
interest in maintaining.121
Bisexuality challenges the essentialist account of human sexuality in at least two ways.
First, many – though by no means all122 – bisexuals understand their sexual identity as
involving some degree of choice, and often a highly politicised choice at that.123 Liz
Highleyman, for example, describes how she came to identify as bisexual in the following
terms:

Some people become radicalised politically because of their oppression as gays, lesbians and
bisexuals. Others questions their heterosexuality as a result of their radical politics .. . It was

within radical political circles, in fact, that I ﬁrst got to know bisexual, gay and lesbian
people. I began to wonder why so many people who shared my political ideals rejected
traditional notions of gender and sexuality, and I started to question many of the assumptions I
had grown up with. When I thought about it, it made little sense to rule out the romantic and
sexual potential of half of humanity.124

Second, many bisexuals report that their sexual identity is ﬂuid and undergoes shifts over
time. Marie King, for example, notes that ‘[h]aving lived my life for a number of years as a
heterosexual and then for an equally long period as a lesbian, I have lately arrived at a
kind of bisexual synthesis’.125 Others, such as Dave Matteson, suggest that their sexual
identity – or the identity that they present to others – shifts even more frequently in
response to social context:

I made a decision fairly early in my public coming out to frequently use the word gay when
speaking to the mainstream heterosexual community. I did not want to have my bisexuality
seen as minimizing the side of me that is gay. On the other hand, when doing work in the
gay community I have stressed being bisexual, to help ﬁght the prejudice there against
bisexuals.126

Or, as Starhawk puts it in more colourful terms,

those of us who are bisexual, and honest, have to admit that our sexual orientation sometimes
seems to change with the phases of the moon or the level of pollen in the air, or just with
propinquity to whoever happens to be around. I honour the lesbian and gay activists who
have made their sexual orientation a cornerstone of their identities, and respect the political
need for doing so .. . But if I’m honest about my own sexual identity, it has something to do
with a deep reluctance to be pinned down.127

Taken together, because many in both heterosexual and sexual minority communities have
an interest in preserving essentialist understandings of human sexuality, and because
bisexuality challenges these understandings, bisexuality is often downplayed, ignored, or
even erased. Yoshino calls this phenomenon ‘the epistemic contract of bisexual
erasure’.128 The result of this epistemic contract is that bisexuality is largely invisible in
both heterosexual and sexual minority communities.129
It is worth reﬂecting on the possibility that the invisibility of bisexuality in the refugee
determination systems in Canada, the United States, and Australia, as well as in some of
the work of contemporary refugee law scholars, both partakes in and contributes to this
epistemic contract of bisexual erasure.

Low grant rates in bisexual refugee claims
Once the invisibility of bisexual refugee claimants is challenged, one of the most pressing
issues that needs to be explored is why bisexuals face much lower refugee claim grant rates
than those involving gay men and lesbians in Canada, the United States, and Australia.
A full analysis of the low grant rates for bisexual refugee claimants would require an
extensive review of unpublished refugee decisions. The methodological challenges
involved in such a review render this enterprise beyond the scope of this paper.
However, based on the few reported decisions involving bisexual refugee claimants, a
few tentative observations can be made.
First and foremost, reported refugee decisions reveal troubling views about bisexuality
held by refugee claims adjudicators. Perhaps the most ﬂagrant example can be found in the
comments made by an adjudicator at the Australian RRT in a case involving a bisexual
refugee claimant from China.130 In this decision, after accepting that homosexuals
constitute a particular social group for the purposes of the refugee deﬁnition,131 the RRT
went on to note that,

by stressing at the hearing that he is bisexual, the Applicant has not satisﬁed the Tribunal that he
is reconciled to homosexual activity, lifestyle or even social association, or that he has any kind
of preternatural homosexual identity or tendencies. It seems to the Tribunal that if this case
were about political opinion, it would be as if the Applicant were saying that, at heart, he
was a little bit disposed towards democracy but also eager to support authoritarianism; if it
were about religion, it would be as if the Applicant, at heart, were a little bit Christian and
a little bit atheist. There is signiﬁcant equivocation in the Applicant’s evidence and it goes
against him.132

To understand this passage, it is important to emphasise that the RRT went on to note that
‘the notion of a group deﬁned as “bisexuals” has been considered insofar as the homosexual
side of bisexual[s] .. . were an issue’.133 The RRT, in other words, was prepared to entertain
the possibility that bisexuals may meet the refugee deﬁnition where they faced persecution
because of their ‘homosexual side’. However, the RRT simultaneously found that the mere
assertion of bisexuality was sufﬁcient evidence to hold that the claimant did not, in fact,
have a ‘homosexual side’ (that is, he was not ‘reconciled to homosexual activity, lifestyle
or even social association’ and did not have ‘any kind of preternatural homosexual identity
or tendencies’).134 The understanding of homosexuality that animated such a holding is one
that sees homosexuality as the absence or antithesis of heterosexual desire. Combined with
the notion that bisexuals are only eligible for refugee status to the extent that they will
otherwise be persecuted on account of homosexuality, this understanding of
homosexuality serves to erase the very possibility that bisexuals may be eligible for
refugee status.
This case was admittedly an outlier in that, as we have seen, several refugee tribunals
and courts have accepted bisexuality as a basis for refugee claims. However, troubling
comments and ﬁndings made by adjudicators are not infrequent in refugee claims

involving bisexuals. Sometimes the ﬁndings made by adjudicators in such claims are so
disturbing that even the lawyers representing the governments will distance themselves
from them. For example, in a recent Canadian federal court judicial review of a
negative refugee determination involving an 18-year-old bisexual from Saint Lucia,
‘counsel for the Minister conceded that some of the .. . ﬁndings were “silly” and that the
[adjudicator]’s language was “inappropriate”’.135 The ‘silliest’ and most ‘inappropriate’
of the ﬁndings in question related to a purported inconsistency identiﬁed by the
adjudicator in the claimant’s failure to engage in sexual activity in Canada,
notwithstanding her previous sexual experiences with both men and women:

The claimant testiﬁed that she has not been sexually active [in Canada]. She [says she] is
underage to go to gay clubs and she is busy with going to school. It is difﬁcult to believe how a
person sexually active with a male and two females from the age of 14 is living a celibate life
now.136

This comment is disturbing because it closely matches negative stereotypes about bisexuals
as sexually voracious or ‘pathologically promiscuous’.137 Indeed, in the cited passage the
adjudicator appeared to reject the claimant’s asserted bisexual identity merely because the
claimant’s behaviour (that is, ‘celibacy’) departed from these stereotypes. This indicates not
only that individuals whose sexual identities depart from the stereotypes about human
sexuality held by adjudicators may have their refugee claims improperly denied, but also
that the underlying understanding of human sexuality held by some adjudicators
continues to be premised upon immutability. More speciﬁcally, this particular
adjudicator was simply unwilling to accept that the claimant’s sexual behaviour
might change in response to different circumstances; the adjudicator seemed to be
saying that if the claimant really had sexual relations with both men and women from
the age of 14, then she would necessarily continue to do so at the age of 18, irrespective

of the very different circumstances in which she now found herself.
Although explicit remarks involving such extremely negative views of bisexuality have
been relatively rare in reported refugee decisions involving bisexuals, troubling views of
bisexuality were nonetheless frequently implicit in the types of evidence that refugee
claims adjudicators cited when assessing the sexual identities of refugee claimants. For
example, in a Canadian case involving a woman from Iran, the IRB cited evidence that
the claimant intended to marry a man to conclude that the claimant was not, in fact, a
bisexual. As the adjudicator put it,

The claimant arrived in Canada with a male companion .. . In response to the question as to
whether they were planning to get married, the claimant replied, ‘So far there is a commitment
but ofﬁcially we haven’t signed a paper or anything.’ . . . [The claimant’s] actions are those of a
heterosexual woman.138

Similarly, in another Canadian case involving a woman from Hungary, the IRB held that the
claimant was not a bisexual, partly based on evidence of prior different-sex sexual conduct:

The claimant came to Canada because allegedly she was persecuted, among other reasons, on
account of her sexual orientation. However . . . the evidence shows that since last year she has
been living with her boyfriend.139

These decisions were seriously problematic, as they failed to understand the reality of
bisexual experiences. Indeed, one of the common themes of literature on bisexuality is
the challenge of having one’s bisexual identity taken seriously when one is in a sexually
exclusive long-term relationship. The difﬁculty bisexuals encounter in this regard is that
one’s sexual identity is often read with reference to the gender of one’s current or recent

sexual partner(s). Consider, for example, the frustration expressed by Ruth Colker, a
leading bisexual theorist, with being perceived as heterosexual because of her marriage
to a man: ‘in cases such as mine, most people probably just attach the label “married
woman” to me with its assumptions about exclusive heterosexuality without even inquiring
about my sexual orientation’.140 Similarly, as William Burleson notes, ‘if a self-identiﬁed
bisexual woman is in a monogamous relationship with another woman, she is now
assumed to be lesbian’.141
In order to challenge these views, it is important to emphasise that although some
bisexuals have multiple recent or concurrent sexual partners of various sexes/genders,142
others may be in long-term sexually exclusive relationships.143 Consider, for example,
the following comments by Rifka Reichler:

I am a 23-year-old married Jewish woman. I have never slept with a woman, nor do I expect to.
Yet, I am bisexual .. . and participate in the bisexual community. The newspapers and
newsletters I read, the conversations I have with friends, the buttons I hang in my study,
and the organizations I join all afﬁrm my bisexuality. The term bisexual afﬁrms the part of
me that loves women, now and in the future, regardless of who I am sleeping with.144

If one understands that sexual identity and sexual behaviour are not necessarily
perfectly correlated, as the above comments by bisexual authors attest, then it seems
unclear in what respect evidence that a refugee claimant maintains a sexually exclusive
relationship could plausibly be read as challenging the credibility of his or her asserted
bisexual identity. Rather, the fact that adjudicators in bisexual refugee claims cited such
evidence suggests that they were actually concerned with establishing, not whether the
claimant was bisexual, but rather where the claimant ﬁt into an essentialist hetero/
homosexual binary.
A similar point can be made with regard to cases where evidence of same-sex sexual

relationships was disregarded in assessing a refugee claimant’s sexual minority identity.
For example, in a recent Australian bisexual refugee case, the RRT, after noting that the
male claimant had previously maintained sexual relationships with women, dismissed
evidence regarding the claimant’s ongoing sexual relationship with a man while he was
in long-term immigration detention.145 The RRT in particular noted that

I do not accept that the Applicant is in fact bisexual .. . I consider that his relationship with .. .
[another male immigration detainee] is simply the product of the situation where only partners
of the same sex are available and says nothing about his sexual orientation.146

In another Australian bisexual refugee case involving a man from Pakistan, the RRT
stated:

The Tribunal accepts that the Applicant might have enjoyed sexual play with other males when
he was a teenager .. . However, the Tribunal is not prepared to accept on the evidence before it
that this was anything but a transient, youthful phase.147

Again, what is troubling about these remarks is that the adjudicators seemed to be
preoccupied with uncovering the claimants’ essential and unchangeable ‘true’ sexual
identities. Evidence of same-sex sexual behaviour that the adjudicators understood as
being affected by a particular social context – for example, youthful experimentation or
sex-segregated incarceration – may therefore be disregarded. Thus, the following
remarks by Millbank about the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal are apposite and can
be extended to other refugee claims adjudication bodies:

In situations where the applicant was seen as having some choice, or their sexuality any way
ﬂuid or temporary – if they could be seen as bisexual, young, sexually inexperienced generally,
or having had only limited same-sex-sexual experiences, the Australian tribunal, in particular,
was very reluctant to accept them .. . under the social group category.148

In the end, if these troubling comments in the few reported cases involving bisexual refugee
claimants reﬂect the overall trend among the unpublished cases, then one possible
explanation for the low refugee claim grant rates for bisexuals is that although in principle
bisexuals who have a well founded fear of being persecuted for their sexual
orientation are eligible for refugee status, in practice at least some refugee claims
adjudicators will only grant refugee status to sexual minorities who display more
traditionally understood sexual identities that ﬁt within an essentialised homo/hetero
binary. As previously mentioned, however, such a hypothesis needs to be tested further
by reviewing decisions that were unpublished.

Conclusion
This paper has sought to shed light on an area of international refugee law that seldom
attracts much attention: refugee claims made by bisexuals. It has demonstrated that
bisexuals outside their countries of origin who have a well-founded fear of persecution
on grounds of their sexual orientation in principle meet the refugee deﬁnition. However,
it has also shown that, at least in Canada, the United States, and Australia, bisexual
refugee claimants are much less likely to succeed in securing refugee status than are
other groups of sexual minorities. As few decisions involving bisexual refugee claimants
are published, further empirical analysis of unpublished decisions should be undertaken
to identify the causes of the low success rates in bisexual refugee claims. On the basis of
the few decisions that were published, I hypothesise that such research would reveal that
among the reasons for the low grant rates include (1) the invisibility of bisexuality and

(2) the disparaging views of some refugee claims adjudicators on bisexuality and their
willingness to grant refugee status to bisexuals only to such extent as their cases appear
to match adjudicators’ perceptions of homosexual or lesbian sexual identities.
Ultimately, we must bear in mind that the stakes in refugee determinations are immense.
Negative and wrongly decided refugee claims will result in individuals being forcibly
repatriated to countries where they will face persecution, torture, or even death.
Accordingly, the current treatment of bisexual refugee claimants in Canada, the United
States, and Australia provides cause for grave concern.
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